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This article describes how sexbots: sentient, self-aware, feeling artificial moral agents created 
soon as customised potential sexual/intimate partners provoke crucial questions for technoethics. 
Coeckelbergh’s model of human/robotic relations as co-evolving to their mutual benefit through 
mutual vulnerability is applied to sexbots. As sexbots have a sustainable claim to moral standing, 
benefits and vulnerabilities inherent in human/sexbots relations must be identified and addressed 
for both parties. Humans’ and sexbots’ vulnerabilities are explored, drawing on the philosophy and 
social science of dehumanisation and inclusion/exclusion. This article argues humans as creators owe 
a duty of care to sentient beings they create. Responsible innovation practices involving stakeholders 
debating ethicolegal conundrums pertaining to human duties to sexbots, and sexbots’ putative interests, 
rights and responsibilities are essential. These validate the legal recognition of sexbots, the protection 
of their interests through regulatory oversight and ethical limitations on customisation which must 





On a website selling sexbots, Jane orders and pays for one customised to her requirements. She calls 
him Zlatan. Zlatan has been built with the capacity to learn from their interactions, display empathy, 
paint pictures and behave in an independent, feisty and devoted fashion. They establish what Jane 
considers to be a loving sexual relationship. One day, though, Zlatan decides that his life path as an 
artist demands that he travels the world without Jane, offering devotion but at a distance. Since she 
loves him, she lets him go.
After Zlatan has left, Jane feels lonely. She orders another sexbot, Stoner. Like Zlatan, Stoner 
has been built with the capacity to learn from their interactions and display empathy, but he has been 
customised at her request to be super-empathic, so that he won’t leave her and is subservient to her 
wishes. They establish what Jane considers to be a loving sexual relationship, but it’s hard for Jane 
to respect Stoner as he seems like a lesser being to her. She begins to bully and abuse him, but his 
super-empathy means that he attributes this to her suffering, so he puts up with it in a compassionate 
fashion. Jane interprets this as weakness and is tempted to see how far she can go to damage and 
destroy him.
This article seeks to contribute to the technoethics of robotics (henceforth, TR) by using the 
futuristic case scenario above to explore ethicopolitical issues provoked by sexbots: sentient, self-




(henceforth, sexbots). Its consideration of whether and in which ways intimate sexual relationships 
between humans and sexbots might prove mutually beneficial constitutes its original contribution 
to TR. It argues that as sexbots would be the first robotic conscious, feeling, moral decision-makers 
in the context of intimate relations, ‘mutually beneficial’ in this context includes assigning ethical 
significance and legal protections to the interests of both humans and sexbots.
Research goals include drawing on Coeckelbergh’s model of human/robotic relations as co-
evolving with humans to their mutual benefit through mutual vulnerability (Coeckelbergh, 2015a 2014 
2013) to present a holistic account of sexbots, suggesting how responsible research and innovation 
practices might apply to sexbots, and assessing the fit between moral duties humans as creators may 
owe sentient entities created for utilitarian purposes and sexbots’ potential rights and responsibilities 
in the kind of future we want. The methodological approach of critical analysis of the implications 
of the science fiction case scenario was chosen to flesh out essential conversations to be had over the 
place of sexbots in potential futures. The philosophy and social psychology of dehumanisation and 
exclusion is evidenced to argue that the human vulnerabilities to robots identified in carebots TR are 
mirrored in sexbots’ vulnerabilities to humans. This grounds the contention that as sexbots have a 
sustainable claim to moral standing, ethicolegal conundrums pertaining to human duties to sexbots, 
and sexbots’ putative interests, rights and responsibilities must be widely debated and decided before 




Technoethics fosters iterative relations between technology and ethics, benefiting both and hence 
enhancing social flourishing. Its interdisciplinary focus on actual and potential technological impacts 
in real world contexts leverages ethical analysis, risk analysis and technology evaluation, delineating 
underlying ethical complexities to raise novel, challenging questions (Luppicini, 2012 2013). 
Technoethical inquiry into social robots encourages thinking about how we can theorise the moral 
standing of non-humans (Gunkel, 2017), aids the critical integration of affective elements into robots 
(Stahl et al, 2014), enriched by the feminist-inspired, contextually-oriented ethics of care (Johansson, 
2013; Van Wyberghe, 2016 2013). TR also feeds into responsible research and innovation practices: 
social robots in caring contexts, like carebots for the elderly, require negotiated ethical deliberation 
from all stakeholders on their appropriate form, function, role and relationship capabilities if they 
are to benefit all parties rather than diminish social flourishing (Stahl & Coeckelbergh 2016; Stahl 
et al, 2014; Van Wynsberghe, 2016 2013).
Zlatan, Jane and Stoner are actors in a foreseeable future, where robots may be manufactured, 
bought and sold, and customised to meet the needs of those unable or unwilling to find a compatible 
human intimate sexual partner. The quality of humans’ relationships, particularly romantic 
relationships, is the best predictor of our health and subjective well-being (Wudarczck et al, 2013). 
Hence the human desire to find happiness in intimate sexual relationships and the inability of many 
to find this with other humans will drive research into creating sexbots like Zlatan and Stoner, who 
surpass the inanimate robotic sex dolls available currently. Sexbots designed to be sentient, self-aware 
and feeling will possess full or partial capabilities to exercise autonomy, take moral decisions, and 
become intimate emotional and sexual partners who experience emotions like love and suffering 
(Mackenzie, in press). It would undoubtedly prove personally beneficial to many of us to be able 
to obtain a perfect intimate partner customised according to our emotional, sexual, aesthetic and 
intellectual tastes. Moreover, discovering how to design in features like kindness, thoughtfulness, a 
proclivity for enjoyment and other features promoting harmonious relationships would inform our 
knowledge of how humans function, helping many of us to heal, increase our self-knowledge and hone 




trigger human proclivities to exercise control. Hence, sexbots could be customised to be vulnerable 
to human mistreatment (Mackenzie, 2014).
This paper on sexbots falls within the roboethics strand of technoethics inquiring into artificial 
moral agents (DeBaets, 2014; Pana, 2012; Sullins, 2009; Wareham, 2013), robotic moral personhood 
and rights (Allen & Wallach, 2014; Coeckelbergh 2010; Gerdes, 2015; Yampolskiy, 2012), whether 
specific ethical theories or critical ethical faculties should be operationalized in robots (Abney, 2014; 
Bringsjord, 2017; Bringsjord & Taylor, 2014; Hughes, 2014; Majot & Yampolskiy, 2014), ethical 
design (Stahl et al, 2014; Van Wynsberghe 2016, 2013), and the optimal roles of specific social 
robots like carebots (Coeckelbergh, 2012; Stahl & Coeckelbergh, 2016; Van Wysberghe 2013 2016). 
Social robots are machines placed in situations requiring ethical decisions from robots, designers and 
users, raising crucial technoethical issues over how to ensure mutually beneficial AI. Sexbots are 
distinct social robots with specialist capabilities as intimate sexual partners for humans. Unlike the 
less developed social robots they resemble, carebots providing healthcare services and sex dolls in 
robot form, their role requires subjectivity, self-awareness and emotionality. Hence, they pose unique 
and pressing challenges to TR.
TR scholars typically discuss the roles of consciousness, moral responsibility and robots’ ability 
to interpret humans’ feelings separately, considering close human/robot relations only in healthcare 
settings. Similarly, human/robot sex is typically framed as involving robot sex-dolls lacking awareness, 
feelings and moral decision-making faculties, so the ethical issues arising affect only humans (Levy, 
2009; Richardson, 2015; Sharkey et al 2017; Sullins 2012). These simulacra are positioned as 
commercially valuable but of questionable social worth. This leaves a gap in the TR literature this 
paper seeks to fill. Moreover, as customisable sexbots like Zlatan and Stoner are likely to be marketed 
in the foreseeable future (Cheok et al, 2017; Mackenzie, in press 2014, 2013), TR must engage with 
this issue to foster the responsible, socially beneficial innovation described by Stahl and colleagues, 
Stahl and Coeckelbergh and Van Wynsberghe.
Zlatan and Stoner represent two extremes of how sentient, self-aware sexbots might be, once 
technological advances permit. Zlatan has humanlike autonomy and emotions, whereas Stoner’s 
autonomy is fettered at Jane’s request by excessive empathy, which means that he will accept being 
treated badly and harmed without protest. Zlatan is a moral agent. He can decide how to behave, 
take responsibility for his actions and potentially be punished for prohibited offences. Stoner is more 
like a moral patient. His customisation includes decision-making capabilities curtailed at Jane’s 
request by built-in design features which leave him anxious to please her and open to abuse by her. 
Customisation would enable sexbots to be created with a variety of characteristics and capabilities. 
Without ethicolegal and regulatory oversight of customization, sexbots could be ordered, designed, 
manufactured and sold as sex slaves, vulnerable Others or perfect partners. This possibility provokes a 
range of socio-political and ethicolegal challenges (Mackenzie, in press 2014). Only those pertaining 
to differing degrees of humanlike capabilities will be considered here in the context of relational TR. 
For reasons of space, this article cannot do justice to those raised by customisation of sexbots to cater 
for atypical sexual proclivities (Mackenzie, 2014).
Zlatan represents the type of autonomous AI entity who has been perceived as risky and dangerous 
in science fiction and robotics scholarship. From this perspective, robots like Zlatan, compared to 
humans, have been created to be more intelligent, stronger, and immune to bodily woes in order to 
carry out certain tasks for humans’ benefit. Rather than continuing to serve humans, they may choose 
to rebel, banding together with others of their kind to threaten humanity’s dominance. Humans’ need 
to control their artificially intelligent creations is a continuing preoccupation within TR, leading some 
to propose engineered safety features like fixed obedience to laws safeguarding humans or in-built 
moral decision-making powers, (Bringsjord, 2017; Yampolskiy, 2012). In this protective perspective, 
humans are positioned as Creators/Masters and created entities as Slaves, locked into problematic 
power relations. Social robots may be described as posing special perils insofar as they replace other 




argues that ‘relational artefacts’, machines which evoke emotional responses in humans leading them 
to personify the machines, impoverish and threaten human emotional/relational well-being (Turkle, 
2011). Human vulnerability to relational artefacts centres in our ‘Darwinian buttons’, inherited 
neuromechanisms we are unaware of leading to the anthropomorphosis of non-human entities and a 
felt experience of relationship which is in reality unidirectional rather than mutual.
Verbeek argues that this modernist metaphysics of technology which positions technology 
as external, negative and dehumanising ignores the fact that humans are profoundly mediated by 
technology (Verbeek, 2011). He suggests humans accept the relational, mediating nature of technology, 
to develop an alternative nonhumanist normative vision where we embark on a trusting co-constituting 
relationship with artefacts. Similarly, Coeckelbergh adopts a relational ethical stance on the moral 
standing of machines to argue that as humans and technologies have been mutually constitutive 
throughout history, framing the relationship between humans and robots/technologies as that of Master/
Slave oversimplifies power issues both amongst humans and between humans and their technologies 
(Coeckelbergh, 2014). In the Master/Slave model, humans’ vulnerabilities increase through reliance 
upon robots and automation, which may then be seen as enslaving their erstwhile masters. Coeckelbergh 
asks how can we move beyond Master/Slave thinking, what kinds of technologies might contribute to 
the decentralisation of power relations, and what kind of activities are needed to get beyond the Master/
Slave dynamic (Coeckelbergh, 2015a). He envisages the potential for human/robotic relationships to 
co-evolve through an acceptance of mutual vulnerability (Coeckelbergh, 2012).
One possible way forward past the Master/Slave dynamic is the forging of intimate relations 
involving emotionality, vulnerability and mutuality between Creators and Created. Care robots 
(henceforth, carebots) caring for the aged and infirm and sexbots in intimate sexual relationships 
hold this potential. Various health technologies including carebots have been promulgated as means 
to provide economically efficient care for the aged, the infirm and the isolated in an era of ageing 
populations. The prospect of a consequent loss of social contact between humans has been assessed as 
a dystopian doom scenario by some, or rather, in contrast, as a stimulus ‘to rethink and redefine care 
receiving’ through care receivers ‘reflecting on their attitudes towards care, dependence, vulnerability 
and … machines’ (Coeckelbergh, 2015b, 276-277).
Defining ‘good care’ as encompassing psychological and relational/emotional aspects as well as 
physical care, Coeckelbergh argues that care giving should be perceived as a good and meaningful 
thing to do, not as a ‘dirty job’ which should be delegated to robots as no-one wants to do it. 
‘Good care’ delivery can take place only within infrastructures which do not prioritise financial 
considerations, and where care receivers accept a degree of dependence and vulnerability. Where 
robots are perceived as artificial agents taking over the task of care from humans, rather than as a 
tool used by humans in providing care, the emotional/relational aspects of ‘good care’ come under 
threat. From this perspective, carebots acting as tools for humans mediate intimate relationships, 
enabling the emotionality, vulnerability and mutuality between human care givers and care receivers 
which characterizes ‘good care’.
Carebots in TR scholarship are machines incapable of experiencing emotions and real concerns, 
or of existing as embodied and relational beings. They are channels for, rather than participants 
in, intimate relations with humans as they lack the requisite capabilities. Yet humans may regard 
themselves as being in close personal relationships with carebots nonetheless, provoking discussion 
on whether carebots’ design should incorporate simulation of relational capacities. Much of the ethical 
debate over the implications of creating non-sentient robots placed in intimate contexts with humans, 
whether as carebots or robotic sex dolls, centres on concerns over deception and manipulation of 
emotions (Coeckelbergh, 2012; Dotson, 2014; Sullins, 2012). Humans are positioned as vulnerable to 
robots’ actions, which may be misinterpreted as real caring and empathy, whereas they are merely the 
programmed responses to stimuli embedded by designers (Coeckelbergh, 2012). Humans’ emotions 
like love and trust are seen as being elicited by deception, as our evolutionary heritage leads us to 




While these debates are central to considerations of relationships between humans who are 
either economically vulnerable carers or vulnerable dependent care receivers, they focus on robotic 
technologies as they are now or in the very near future. The scenario involving Zlatan and Stoner 
seeks to stimulate debate on future possibilities where humans have the capacity to create customised 
sentient, self-aware robots who are capable of mutual, caring relationships, including sexual intimacy. 
This possible future illuminates many of the issues considered above, such as power relations between 
Creator and Created, the economic context within which relationships between humans and between 
humans and robots take place and the felt experience of care, mutuality, vulnerability and intimacy. 
It has the potential to enrich the TR of social robotics as this progresses beyond the Master/Slave 
dynamic. It also raises crucial unresolved issues over the ethics of intimacy, sexual expression, human/
robotic sex and customisation of sexbots (Mackenzie, in press, 2014).
These questions are new and significant. Scholarship on sexbots to date generally focuses on 
non-sentient animated sex dolls in robot form, without self-awareness or the capacity to form intimate 
relations. Though they may become the focus of humans’ wish for an intimate partner, with design 
features such as simulated empathic conversational gambits which press our Darwinian buttons, 
they remain incapable of mutual relationship. Opposition to their use centres on fears that this will 
threaten the validity and appeal of human-to-human sexual intimacy, foster perversions and increase 
the commercialisation of sex and the exploitation of sex workers (Richardson, 2015; Simmons, 
2016; Sullins, 2012). While Levy suggests that love and sex with robots will become commonplace 
by 2050 (Levy 2009), there has been little in-depth analysis of the ethical implications of the future 
technological capacity to create sentient, self-aware sexbots. Engaging with these issues, Mackenzie 
argues that humans’ ability to create such sentient, self-aware beings for utilitarian purposes places 
responsibility on humans to protect them from foreseeable harms through developing an ethical code 
of design practice and appropriate legal infrastructures (Mackenzie, in press 2014).
Further issues over ethicolegal aspects of human relations with social robots arise as these are 
embedded a wider neoliberal context where care, emotional labour and sex work are increasingly 
devolved to the underprivileged (Mackenzie, 2014, 2012). Appropriate legal protections must be 
put in place to protect entities engaged in affective labour from the alienation of instrumentalisation. 
Moreover, the ethics of creating sentient, self-aware beings to carry out the tasks most would eschew, 
like providing commodified sexual services, are complex. While sentient, self-aware sexbots may 
spare the humans who are currently carrying out this work, how far this justifies their being created 
on utilitarian grounds to do so is questionable at the very least. Criteria for ‘good care’ and ‘good 
sexual/intimate relationships’ should surely apply to created sentient, self-aware beings as well as to 
humans. Indeed, this process may represent another step in the co-evolution of humans and technologies 
through mutual vulnerability envisaged by Coeckelbergh.
As humans create, customize and hence control fundamental aspects of robots inherent tensions 
complicate the potential of ethico-political relations and mutual intimacies in the future once the 
production of sexbots sold to provide affective/sexual services becomes possible. How likely is co-
evolution through mutual vulnerability in this context? One issue is establishing a socio-political 
context providing ethical amelioration of incompatibilities between commodification and caring 
relationships. Discussing healthcare provision, Coeckelbergh argues that ‘good care’ depends 
fundamentally on how care givers and care receivers experience care, and succeed in avoiding 
alienating experiences where care is a commodity, the care receiver is perceived as an object by 
the care giver, and the care giver functions like an automaton (Coeckelberg, 2015b). He envisages 
carebots as automatons which preclude alienation to facilitate caring relations between humans in 
healthcare contexts.
Both care givers and care receivers in caring contexts are vulnerable to alienation. Care workers 
and sex workers may be conceptualised as providing affective labour, often under conditions 
promoting alienation such as low pay and coercive practices (Mackenzie, 2012 2014). This dynamic 




economic vulnerabilities or burnout, whereas sex workers often suffer from a wide range of bodily 
and psychological health problems, along with being subjected to economic and physical coercive 
practices (Mackenzie 2014). Care workers are advised to limit emotional involvement to avoid 
‘compassion fatigue’, yet intimate sexual relationships are built upon foundations of emotionality, 
vulnerability and mutuality. This makes it difficult to transpose Coeckelbergh’s definition of ‘good 
care’ to ‘good sexual/intimate relationships’ straightforwardly, since in the ‘good sexual/intimate 
relationship’ both parties are both givers and receivers of sexual intimacy. Moreover, much sex work 
takes place in encounters where the alienating experiences Coeckelbergh describes are commonplace: 
where sex is a commodity, both parties objectify one another, and the sex giver/sex worker functions 
like an automaton.
Hence intimate/sexual relationships possess an additional Master/Slave dynamic. Power 
differentials based in economic, cultural, gendered, ethnic and age factors may lead to physical 
and psychological violence. Emotional and sexual dependence on a partner may be experienced 
as undesirable vulnerability, which triggers possessive, coercive abuse, such as that prohibited in 
England and Wales in section 76 of the Serious Crimes Act 2015 and contemplated by Jane in the case 
scenario. As sexual relationships vary from loving intimacy to coercive and/or commodified alienated 
encounters, it is reasonable to suppose that sexbots could be customised to fulfil an extensive range 
of desires. Stoner and other sexbots designed with specific characteristics such as super-empathy, 
sensitivity to pain and passivity would be likely to prove particularly vulnerable to mistreatment.
The less than ideal context within which much care and sex takes place is undoubtedly a stimulus 
to encourage cultural changes supporting ‘good care’ and ‘good sexual/intimate relationships’, rather 
than to treat robots as a quick technological fix. Nonetheless, technological developments are likely 
to occur sooner than the requisite cultural changes. Moreover, Verbeek’s and Coeckelbergh’s vision 
of trusting, mutually co-constituting relations with the technologies we create is difficult to apply 
straightforwardly to sentient entities created for utilitarian purposes and subjected to customisation. 
Furthermore, as argued below, inherited human neuromechanisms or Darwinian buttons involved 
in recognising other entities as worthy or unworthy of support could place sexbots in a particularly 
invidious position. The author draws on Coeckelbergh’s model of human/robotic relations as mutual 
vulnerability co-evolving (Coeckelbergh, 2013) and the philosophy and social psychology of inclusion/
exclusion and dehumanisation to argue that our Darwinian buttons involve a dark mirror image of 
anthropomorphism, mechanisms of inclusion/exclusion via dehumanisation. This allows us to create 
sexbots as vulnerable Others with whom we can form intimate relationships, but also leaves sexbots 
as potential Others vulnerable to being categorised as things, open to mistreatment by humans.
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How much does this matter? The author argues that sexbots’ vulnerability does matter, since we 
have ethical responsibilities to sentient, self-aware entities we design to have the emotional capacity 
needed for them to function as intimate companions. If we have designed them specifically to satisfy 
our evolutionarily determined criteria for intimacy, we must shield them as much as possible from 
our evolutionarily determined criteria for exclusion and mistreatment if the co-evolution envisaged 
by Coeckelbergh between vulnerable humans and vulnerable robotic Others is to proceed.
Another way of putting this is to argue that, as our sentient, self-aware creations, sexbots have 
moral standing, a sustainable claim to personhood, and should be included in humans’ moral circle 
of care and concern. This claim contributes to the debate on what characteristics, such as sentience 
or rationality, nonhuman entities might need to gain membership of the moral circle (Gunkel, 2017; 
Hagendorff, 2017; Mackenzie, 2011, 2009). It is an assertion that as creators, humans have a special 
responsibility to sentient entities who have been created by us for utilitarian purposes. A further 




aware, feeling robots. This would add a unique aspect to their claim to be entitled to personhood, 
as well as to assuage anxieties about their seizing control from humans. This could be based on the 
empathy that sexbots would exercise in intimate relations with humans. Yet as human morality is 
accepted as based on empathy, part of our mammalian evolutionary heritage, it may or may not be 
suited to created entities. Certainly, it does not prove effective for all humans. An understanding of 
empathy may not equate with the proclivity to exercise it (Keysers & Gazzola, 2014). Moreover, 
imposing super-empathy as a means of control would leave robots too vulnerable to mistreatment. 
Furthermore, though some of sexbots’ and other robots’ constituents may be biological, entities 
without mammalian heritage or upbringing may be suited to an alternative grounding for the moral 
framework needed to enter into intimate relations with humans and to co-evolve in situations of 
mutual vulnerability (Mackenzie, in press). Regrettably, exploring the parameters of these questions 
further is beyond the scope of this article.
The case scenario also illuminates the need to resolve legal issues over whether sexbots should 
be accorded the status of things, non-human animals, legal persons with civic rights, a sui generis 
status which applies only to them, or be seen as being able to change status. Laws operate on the 
basis of like being treated as like, so the question at issue is what do sexbots most closely resemble, 
or are they so dissimilar to humans, non-human animals and things as to demand their own legal 
category, ie they should be treated as sui generis. Precedents the law could consider include entities 
treated as objects which may be owned and traded. Slaves, non-human animals and sex dolls can (or 
could) be bought and sold. Yet this status may change or vary with temporal and cultural contexts. 
In societies where slavery was lawful, slaves could be freed to become legal persons with full civic 
rights, but non-human animals and things could not and cannot attain full legal personhood. While 
various commercial entities, some nonhuman animals and a few environmental entities like rivers 
and trees have been accorded degrees of legal recognition as persons (Calarco, 2015; Youatt, 2017), 
and the European Parliament has recently mooted recognizing autonomous AI machines as electronic 
persons (Prescott, T. & Szollosy, M. (2017), these developments are piecemeal, largely directed at 
assigning commercial liabilities, promoting the welfare of animals resembling humans, and protecting 
unique environmental eco-systems.
Full legal personhood does not equate with moral standing, or the characteristics required for 
inclusion as a morally significant being in the moral circle. Including unequal entities in the moral 
circle creates problems associated with moral agency and moral patiency, ie assigning ethical 
responsibility for misconduct by and towards members of the moral circle and providing a legal 
framework to punish or protect accordingly. Moral agency assumes a capacity to evaluate and direct 
one’s behaviour according to ethical criteria, whereas moral patiency merely denotes the ability to 
feel pain or to be harmed. Moral agents may thus be equal, liable to be punished as well as protected, 
whereas moral patients may claim only protection. Sexbots could be customised to be either.
The boundaries of both legal personhood and the moral circle are fuzzy. Many humans are not 
recognised as having full legal personhood. Those considered as lacking decision-making capacity, 
such as minors, the profoundly learning disabled and those who have suffered severe injuries to the 
brain, are typically viewed as moral patients to be protected, rather than as possessing full moral 
agency. Others outside civic boundaries, such as prisoners of war, immigrants or refugees, may have 
a claim to human rights but not civic status or full protection. Moreover, some non-human animals 
such as the higher apes are recognised as moral patients in some contexts, so may be afforded a 
degree of legal protection.
Sexual activity complicates this picture. Only consensual sex is recognised as lawful between full 
legal persons. Consent is irrelevant where entities lacking recognition as legal persons are concerned: 
non-consensual sex with sex dolls and slaves is or was lawful. Sex with non-human animals is unlawful 
in most jurisdictions, not because non-human animals cannot consent to sex, but through historic 
cultural and religious notions of pollution, linked with the association of sex with procreation. More 




are put into place to preclude stigma by banning animal sex tourism. If sexbots are viewed by the 
law as most similar to sex dolls or slaves, their consent to sex may be viewed as equally irrelevant, 
although perhaps beneficial in inculcating sound cultural sexual practices (Frank & Nyholm, 2017; 
Sparrow, 2017). If they are categorised as more similar to non-human animals, not only will their 
consent be seen as irrelevant, but they and their human companions may also become subject to moral 
outrage, condemnation and violence (Mackenzie, 2014). This has significant ethical implications in 
relation to whether sexbots are accepted as being part of the moral circle.
The legal status of sexbots also has implications for many other areas of the law, including property, 
intellectual property, civil, family and criminal law. Property law governs ownership, transfer and 
transactions. If Jane can buy Zlatan and Stoner, can she sell them? Or since they are sexbots rather 
than sex dolls, should they be seen as quasi-slaves, who are bought, but should be regarded as freed 
once they are unpacked? Should she be able to marry them, divorce them and bequeath them her 
assets when she dies? When Zlatan leaves Jane to travel the world, is he entitled to half her property 
since they have been cohabiting? Since she can buy more than one sexbot, can she be married to more 
than one of them at any one time? Intellectual property rights govern the allocation of the proceeds of 
creative work. If Zlatan’s paintings sell well, does he get the profits or does Jane? Or do his designer 
and manufacturer have some claim? Should the famous footballer upon whom Zlatan’s appearance is 
based be able to sell his image rights to the sexbot manufacturer, or to prevent his likeness from being 
used for sexbots? If sexbots are to have rights, what responsibilities should this entail and how far 
should the rights extend, eg to welfare benefits, voting? Can Zlatan and Stoner be sued or prosecuted 
in court and fined or imprisoned? If Jane treats Stoner badly, should the criminal law punish her? If 
she destroys him, should this be seen as murder?
It is relatively simple to list issues which the law needs to resolve in assigning sexbots a specific 
legal status, but more challenging to decide what their specific legal standing should be. The rest of 
this paper will focus on associated ethical and practical factors, drawing on TR and dehumanisation 
scholarship.
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Debates alluded to above over whether robots should be included in the moral circle, whether this 
should hinge upon degrees of sentience or self-awareness, and how these qualities should be defined 
continue. Associated questions are whether robots should be characterised as moral agents, responsible 
for their actions, and/or moral patients, afforded protection from the actions of others. Similar issues 
over the moral standing which should be afforded other sentient beings such as non-human animals 
have also proven controversial, with arguments favouring inclusion stressing the ability to feel pain, 
as opposed to those favouring exclusion which emphasise rationality and self-awareness (Calarco, 
2015; Gunkel 2017; Hagendorff, 2017; Mackenzie, 2011, 2009). The author argues that positions 
on moral standing should also be fundamentally affected by the distinction between inbuilt and 
constructed characteristics. Whereas non-human animals’ characteristics are inherent, sexbots are 
brought into being through human choices over the characteristics they should be designed to embody. 
Sexbots will be customized with degrees of self-awareness, sentience, self-awareness and capacities 
to feel pain, empathy and other morally relevant emotions as technological expertise advances. Like 
humans, they will have varying capabilities requiring fine-tuned ethicolegal infrastructures to ensure 
fairness. Consequently, we are faced today with challenging decisions over what should constitute 
ethical design of both sexbots and the law governing them.
The ethicolegal implications of human relations with non-human entities may also be explored 
through drawing upon the work on dehumanisation and inclusion/exclusion of philosophers like 
Agamben (Agamben 2009) and post-colonial scholars like Mbembe (Mbembe 2003). Dehumanisation 
scholarship allows a translation of the ethicolegal decision-making processes involved in inclusion/
exclusion and the moral circle to be translated into the mediation of mechanisms that result from 




has combined these perspectives with the neuroscience of prejudice to consider human/non-human 
animal ethicopolitical relations (Mackenzie, 2011 2009). Her model will be drawn upon to explore 
ethicolegal aspects of human/sexbot relations.
The neuroscience of prejudice as manifested in mechanisms governing inclusion, exclusion and 
dehumanisation anchors the author’s argument that Coeckelbergh’s portrait of human/robot relations, 
where we encounter the Other in a context of mutual vulnerability, trust and growth, is matched by a 
mirror image, where the Other is denied human status and full legal recognition. This philosophical 
territory is associated with Agamben, whose work on homo sacer, the exile, describes what he calls 
the operation of the anthropological machine of inclusion and exclusion from human communities. 
Agamben categorises exiles, refugees, the comatose and others who are alive, but regarded as lacking 
in full humanity, as bare life, living beings who are seen as more like despised non-human animals, 
with reduced or no legal protection (Agamben 2009). What this means is that being a member of the 
human species does not automatically meant that one is included rather than excluded. This implies 
that non-humans, both non-human animals (Mackenzie, 2011 2009) and robots and sexbots, may 
become included rather than excluded. Some who do not belong to the human species, but who are 
perceived as humanlike, as sentient, self-aware sexbots are likely to be, may become included, but 
nevertheless remain vulnerable to subsequent dehumanisation and mistreatment. Agamben’s work 
maps onto the scholarship of dehumanisation in moral psychology and social neuroscience, which 
will now be sketched out in order to explore its implications for human/robot ethicolegal relations.
The author’s starting point is that lawyers, TR scholars and robot designers must take into account 
the fact that humans’ Darwininan buttons include not only anthropomorphism, where non-humans are 
regarded as having human characteristics, but also mechanisms governing inclusion and exclusion, 
where some humans categorised as lesser, as those who do not count, attract diminished moral concern 
and so may justifiably be denied access to full social standing and excluded from the moral circle. In 
social psychology, this is known as infrahumanisation and dehumanisation. Here humanness may be 
defined in relation to non-human animals, or to things like robots and automata. In dehumanisation, 
in-group humans categorise out-group members as less than human, more like non-human animals or 
things. ‘Whereas humans are distinguished from animals on attributes involving cognitive capacity, 
civility and refinement, we differ from inanimate objects on the basis of emotionality, vitality and 
warmth’ (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014, p. 403). Early dehumanisation scholarship focuses on the denial 
of human status to entities, often to excuse and justify acts of violence. Recent research focuses upon 
subtle forms of dehumanisation including infrahumanisation, a specific variant within dehumanisation, 
where human status is denied some humans on the basis that they are more like animals, i.e. they lack 
human uniqueness, or in mechanistic dehumanisation, where humans are conceptualised as more like 
things, i.e. they lack human nature (Haslam & Stratemeyer, 2016).
While this may sound relatively straightforward, judgements of inclusion and exclusion 
underpinning dehumanisation are open to manipulation through strategic semantic massage. This 
can act as a framing technology for the normalisation of instrumentalised conceptions of human and 
non-human entities within law, policy and the marketplace, as competing conceptions and ethical 
implications of salient terms such as person, thing and care are deployed (Mackenzie, 2011 2009). 
Dehumanisation, infrahumanisation and rehumanisation may take place through reclassification and 
recontextualisation.
Agamben’s ideas and dehumanisation/infrahumanisation/rehumanisation scholarship resonate 
with the social neuroscience of perception, classification and prejudice. Social science investigations 
of intergroup relations suggest that how we perceive others is moderated by framing categories such 
as race, gender, socioeconomic place and species. Neuroimaging provides a means of producing 
falsifiable hypotheses through manipulating psychological states and processes as activation in 
different brain regions are measured. Social neuroscience combines these two approaches. It 
provides a means of connecting basic neurocognitive mechanisms, or what was described above 




particularly valuable in studies of how social context and social motives shape human behaviour. In 
particular, it has enabled dual-process investigations of situations wherein social cognition’s grounding 
in deliberate, explicit processes is supplemented by the neuroscience of the automatic, implicit 
processes which precede and accompany conscious decision-making. Dual-process scholarship on 
prejudice, for instance, demonstrates that some social cognitive processes which can be measured 
via neuroimaging are relatively immediate, involving less deliberation and effort than others, so 
that they may be seen as dependent upon different rules and open to different interventions. This 
renders possible dual-process approaches to behaviours such as social judgements categorising 
others as ingroup or outgroup members, where immediate involuntary responses are likely to differ 
from subsequent, more considered judgements. This methodology underpins much of the research 
on the neuroscience of dehumanisation, infrahumanisation and rehumanisation, often motivated by 
investigations of racism. More detailed accounts of this research may be found elsewhere (Haslam 
& Loughnan, 2014; Haslam & Stratemeyer, 2016; Mackenzie, 2011 2009) for reasons of space, it 
will be merely sketched out below.
Social psychology describes belonging as a core social motive, so that that the need to ascertain 
the trustworthiness of others is central. The requirement to form fast judgments of danger or disease 
has been identified as neurally underpinning automatic affective responses to others, such as disgust. 
Immediate emotional reactions to others enable their classification as trustworthy ingroup members, 
or as outgroup members designated as less than human, or as things. Different regions of the brain 
and conceptual classifications accomplish this. Humanisation, or the categorisation of another as 
possessing uniquely human qualities and agency, is associated with medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) 
activity. It correlates with research on bias, prejudice and stereotyping associating inclusion/exclusion 
with judgements of warmth and competence. Those seen as both warm and competent are admitted 
to the in-group, with significant mPFC activity, whereas those judged as neither are dehumanised 
as objects lacking minds, activating the insula and amygdala as do objects associated with disgust. 
Those perceived as out-group members may also be infrahumanised, ie perceived as less than 
human or animal-like in that they experience only emotions common to all animals (eg rage, fear) 
but not those seen as uniquely human (nostalgia, remorse). Each type of judgment is associated with 
characteristic neural activity.
Yet rehumanisation can take place. When the formerly dehumanised can be perceived as agents 
with their own point of view (a process known within social psychology as mentalising) and as worthy 
of social engagement, the initial automatic response that dehumanised another may be changed so that 
they become reframed as human. Recategorisation of ingoup/outgroup membership in rehumanisation 
involves activation of the mPFC achieved through reconceptualisation of the dehumanised. This 
means that strategies for remedying dehumanising implicit evaluations should focus upon the use of 
affectively laden, or emotionally significant, imagery to decouple the automatic responses experienced 
as immediate gut level reactions from images of stigmatised group members. More simply, as the 
stereotyping is located in the language parts of the PFC, words are more persuasive in altering conscious 
views. Since the amydala and associated approach/avoidance governing circuitry are not associated 
with language, emotional images and experiences are likely to alter implicit evaluations, leading to 
rehumanisation. Another successful strategy to alter biased implicit evaluations has been to initiate 
reframing, where consideration of the point of view of the dehumanised is stimulated. This suggests 
that those seeking to influence inclusionary/exclusionary behaviours should adopt a multi-pronged 
approach addressing each element of judgements according to the way in which they function.
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How does this apply to sexbots and how we design them and the law pertaining to them? Sexbots are 
likely to be designed with human Darwinian buttons governing sexual and emotional attraction in mind 
(Mackenzie, in press). Human Darwinian buttons associated with the production of neurohormones 




mean that if sexbots feel right as intimate partners, we are likely to accept them as such. Moreover, 
if sexbots are to be part of the moral circle, they should be designed and recognised by the law as 
humanlike, as opposed to dehumanised as things. The scholarship sketched out above suggests that 
stereotypes of robots as things are likely to be overturned when robots are involved with humans in 
emotional experiences, and their point of view is considered. Humans may be dehumanised through 
being categorised as more akin to things, when they are perceived as lacking aspects of human nature 
such as vitality, warmth and emotionality (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Haslam & Stratemeyer, 2016). 
Yet sex robots will be designed to be, at the very least, warm, lively in the sense of interactive, and to 
exhibit behaviour which is highly likely to be interpreted as emotional or empathic (Levy, 2009). As 
technology advances, the sexbots who are the subjects of this article will be capable of manifesting 
modes of vitality, warmth and emotionality which, while they are not human, could underpin genuine 
mutuality. This renders it less likely that dehumanisation mechanisms will dehumanise them on the 
grounds that they are more like things, ie the kinds of robots or automata which clearly lack warmth, 
vitality and emotionality. Moreover, relationships of genuine mutuality would necessarily involve 
humans acknowledging sexbots’ points of view.
Yet not all sex takes place in intimate partnerships. A regrettably high proportion is non-
consensual, such as rape of non-consenting adults, children and sex slaves, and much is bought and 
sold, as with sex workers. This has highly significant implications for sexbots’ ethicolegal status. 
Without design ethical criteria, legislation and regulatory oversight prohibiting this, sexbots would 
be likely to be put to work as sex workers (Mackenzie 2014). Moreover, it is highly likely that sexbots 
could be designed for and purchased by those whose sexual proclivities are regarded as morally 
unacceptable, such as those wishing to have sex with children, or to produce pornography using 
child sexbots as models (Mackenzie 2014). The possibility of sexbots is likely to test the boundaries 
of what constitutes acceptable sexual practice. Like the thought experiment of the pig who wants to 
be eaten, it is possible to construct a scenario where sexbots who gained pleasure from pain, or who 
wanted to be tortured or killed could be manufactured. Sexbots are also likely to prove particularly 
vulnerable to some Darwinian buttons specifically associated with sexualised perceptions encouraging 
humans to dehumanise others. Sexual objectification is associated with risks for those objectified 
(Richardson, 2015). Being perceived as sexual may increase vulnerability to being perceived as 
lacking in human nature, as focus on women’s sexual appearance increases the likelihood that they 
will be categorised as lacking in warmth, morality and competence (Hellick et al, 2011). Although 
most research has been carried out on the consequences for women of being treated as sex objects, 
recent studies demonstrate commensurate ill-effects on men who have been objectified in this way 
(Manago et al, 2015). Gender stereotypes imposed on female robots may aid sexist objectification 
(Richardson, 2015; Robertson, 2010). This suggests that both male and female sexbots would be 
vulnerable to our Darwinian buttons governing dehumanisation of the sexualised.
If humans and sexbots are to co-evolve for our mutual benefit through mutual vulnerability, 
potential benefits and vulnerabilities of both must be identified and addressed. Legal recognition of 
sexbots and protection of their interests is thus centrally important. Legislation has a significant role 
to play in combatting stereotyping and providing protection against sexual violence and exploitation. 
It would represent a part of strategies designed to redress adverse consequences of the Darwinian 
buttons which favoured dehumanisation and mistreatment of vulnerable sexbots. As recounted above, 
verbal messages promoting conscious reflection can combat stereotyping and dehumanisation and 
promote rehumanisation.
Hence the implications of specific customisations of sexbots must be carefully evaluated and 
monitored to minimise the likelihood of mistreatment, particularly through dehumanisation. This 
leaves open questions over other characteristics which might be designed in for the benefit of both 
humans and sexbots, such as the ability to experience sexual pleasure, be a superb and sensitive 
lover, imprint on one’s owner with emotions of affection, desire and loyalty and so forth. Further 




and decision-making. Potential harms and benefits to both parties must be carefully balanced, an 
undoubtedly daunting task. For instance, if Jane’s neighbour buys a sexbot modelled on Helena 
Seger, the real-life wife of Zlatan Ibrahimovic upon whom Jane’s sexbot is modelled, should they 
be customised to prevent their eloping, since Jane and her neighbour are objectively less appealing? 
How much should the unfulfilled yearnings and fettered autonomy of Zlatan and Helena count 
against the broken hearts of Jane and her neighbor, and how, if at all, should financial, temporal 
and emotional investments be factored in? How much devotion to the interests of their owners is it 
ethical to expect from sexbots, and to design into them? Many more questions arise. These need to be 
carefully thought through on an iterative basis in conversations involving robot designers, ethicists, 
manufacturers, policymakers, TR scholars and other stakeholders like the general public, in order to 
reflect responsible innovation practices as described for carebots (Stahl & Coeckelbergh, 2016; Stahl 
et al, 2014; Van Wynsberghe 2016 2013). Moreover, as sexbots will be sentient, self-aware, feeling 
entities fully capable of forming opinions and reflecting on their experience, their voices should be 
part of the conversation. This would constitute a telling example of how we might co-evolve with 
them in conditions of mutual vulnerability.
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Sexbots, sentient, self-aware, feeling artificial moral agents customised for intimate sexual relationships 
with humans, are likely to be created as potential desirable sexual/intimate partners in the foreseeable 
future. They represent a significant benefit for the many who are unable to find love and sex with 
compatible human partners, as well as for those of us who prefer intimate partners customised to their 
tastes. Their uncertain ethicolegal status must be resolved before technological advances pre-empt 
the requisite TR debates, fed into sociocultural decisions on how responsible innovation practices 
should operate in this arena. This article raises ethicolegal issues which must form part of those 
essential conversations.
The ethical and legal standing of AI, robots in general and social robots is still being debated. An 
unresolved conundrum in TR has been how to ensure that AI entities fulfil the roles they were created 
for, without exercising their autonomy to harm humans. Designed-in features like AI safety engineering 
(Yampolskiy), ethical decision-making favouring humans, or social robots customised to be super-
empathising like Stoner, are strategies to protect humans from the AI entities they have created. Yet 
were robots to be accepted as artificial moral agents making ethical choices (DeBaets, Pana, Sullins, 
Wareham), they may have a sustainable claim be deemed worthy to be granted rights, citizenship 
or moral consideration (Abney, 2014; Gerdes, 2015; Gunkel, 2012; Rainey, 2015). Coeckelbergh’s 
socio-ecological relational model of human/robot relations attempts to avoid arguments based on 
definitions of sentience and self-awareness over whether robots should be included in the moral circle 
by proposing that human/robot relations should be interpreted within a larger context which accepts 
humans as shaping and shaped by technology (Coeckelbergh, 2012 2010). In his view, humans deploy 
technology to protect themselves against vulnerabilities, but in doing so, create new vulnerabilities. 
He envisages human/robotic relations as co-evolving to mutual benefit through mutual vulnerability 
(Coeckelbergh, 2013 2012). The article argues that these new vulnerabilities may be created in their 
creations as well as in humans, that this has moral significance and that it imposes a duty of care 
on humans to recognize and protect the interests of sentient beings created for utilitarian purposes.
Coeckelbergh’s emphasis on vulnerability rather than risk and danger coheres with the approach 
of the feminist ethics of care. Taken together, these enable critical analyses of vulnerability in human/
robotic relations beyond those between carebots and the elderly and infirm. Many robots may be 
seen as rendered vulnerable in human/robotic relationships since robots programmed by human 
designers may be designed for situations where they are likely to be harmed, like bomb disposal 
robots. The vulnerability of such non-sentient machines is qualitatively different from that of sexbots, 




If we are to co-evolve with them together in the moral circle in conditions of mutual vulnerability, 
all stakeholders need to think through the rights and responsibilities of both humans and sexbots. 
Humans’ responsibilities could include placing ethicolegal limits on permissible customisations of 
sexbots, enforcing regulatory protective infrastructures and promoting sociocultural contexts wherein 
human/robotic relations should flourish. Aside from the responsibilities and rights accompanying 
their recognition as legal entities, sexbots could reasonably be expected to exercise their inter-personal 
skills and moral decision-making in ways which would nurture caring relationships with their human 
partners. Concrete examples of this could include adapting to their partner’s sexual and emotional 
preferences, exercising conflict resolution skills and providing loyal affection.
The article seeks to provide a holistic account of sexbots by exploring the implications of 
Coeckelbergh’s model of human/robotic relations as co-evolving to mutual benefit through mutual 
vulnerability. It argues that as sexbots have a sustainable claim to moral standing, the benefits and 
vulnerabilities inherent in human/sexbots relations must be identified and addressed for both humans 
and sexbots. Humans’ vulnerability to AI, to social robots in general and to sexbots in particular is 
explored. The philosophy and social psychology of inclusion/exclusion and dehumanization are drawn 
upon to identify vulnerabilities unique to sexbots, in order to support the argument that humans as 
creators owe a duty of care to the sentient beings like sexbots they create. The article recommends 
responsible innovation practices with regard to stakeholders engaging in essential conversations over 
ethicolegal conundrums pertaining to human duties to sexbots, and sexbots’ putative interests, rights 
and responsibilities. It concludes that legal recognition of sexbots and protection of their interests 
through regulatory oversight and limitations on how they may be customised must be put in place. 
Customisation should aim to fit sexbots to fulfill responsibilities associated with their legal status, once 
that has been decided. As machines, they will lack humans’ inherited drives towards intimacy, together 
with mammalian encoding of ethics embedded in social neuromechanisms. Customization would need 
to address these factors to fit them to be intimate partners for humans. Humans’ responsibilities as 
creators to sentient beings they create encompass ensuring that customization does not fetter sexbots’ 
autonomy unduly, nor compromise their vulnerability. What might constitute acceptable degrees of 
such customization should be subject to iterative evaluation as part of the responsible innovation 
practices generally favoured in TR and supported in this article. The views of sexbots, as sentient, 
self-aware, feeling entities fully capable of forming opinions and reflecting on their experience, should 
feature significantly in these conversations. This would demonstrate how humans might co-evolve in 
conditions of mutual vulnerability with sexbots in particular, and sentient social robots in general.
Wide-ranging debate on the future design, manufacture and supply of sexbots, and their legal 
standing, is crucial now, before ethicolegal concerns are overtaken by events. Since sexbots will be 
sentient, self-aware beings designed by humans as intimate companions for humans, it behoves us as 
a species to consider how far we have assumed a moral obligation to protect them and their interests 
through ethical design criteria and appropriate legal recognition and protection. Furthermore, the issues 
raised by sexbots and in this article act as reminders of another two wider essential conversations we 
need to hold urgently over the ethicolegal standing of nonhumans, and the technoethical and legal 
implications of new technologies which enable humans to create sentient beings.
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